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Abstract—Among others, drinking water belongs to the so-
called critical infrastructures. To ensure that the water produc-
tion meets current and future societal needs, a systematic and
rigorous analysis is needed. In this paper, we report our first
experience with dependability analysis of the last phase of a water
treatment facility, namely the water distribution. We use the
architectural language Arcade to model this facility and use the
Arcade toolset to compute three relevant dependability measures:
the availability of the water distribution, the reliability, i.e., the
probability that the water distribution fails, and the survivability,
that is, the ability to recover from disasters. Since survivability
is not directly expressible in the Arcade formalism, we show how
one can modify the toolchain for the analysis of survivability.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent report of the Dutch Ministry for Internal Affairs
[6], water cleaning and distribution has been identified as one
of thirteen critical infrastructures. They all include assets that
are essential for the functioning of a society and economy.
Hence, it is very important that critical infrastructures survive
catastrophic events. A water treatment facility cleans raw water
in approximately fifteen steps before the water is distributed to
households and companies. In case the facility fails to provide
clean water it will be charged high fines by the companies it is
supposed to deliver to, and it will suffer damage to its public
image.
This paper focuses on the distribution station of a water
treatment facility, for which availability, the readiness for
correct service [1], reliability, the continuity of correct service
[1] and survivability, the ability to recover [4], are analyzed.
Using the Arcade tool [2] an Input/Output interactive Markov
chain (I/O-IMC) model of the distribution station is defined.
While availability and reliability can be readily computed
within Arcade, we show in the following how the toolset
can be enhanced to compute survivability measures. In [2]
the availability and reliability of a distributed database system
and of a reactor cooling system have been computed using
Arcade. In [4] the survivability of the Google file-system is
computed using a continuous stochastic logic (CSL) model
checking approach. Until now, however, Arcade has never been
used to compute survivability type of measures.
Organization of the paper. This paper is organized as follows.
In Section II we introduce the water distribution process and
in Section III Arcade is shortly described. Section V describes
the measures of interest, and how they can be computed within
Arcade. In Section VI we discuss the analytical results before
Section VII concludes this paper.
II. WATER DISTRIBUTION PROCESS
Figure 1 depicts the global structure of the water distribution
process. It consists of the two water reservoirs, a pumping
station, and a distribution station. The reservoirs are used to
store the cleaned drinking water before it is pumped, by the
pumping station, to the distribution station, which distributes
the water to two different water districts.
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Fig. 1. Storage and water distribution within the water treatment facility.
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Fig. 2. Water distribution.
III. ARCADE
Arcade is an architectural language developed by Crouzen et
al.[2] to model and analyze dependability at a system level.
Arcade modeling. Arcade models a system using three basic
buildingblocks: (i) a Basic Component (BC), (ii) a Repair Unit
(RU) and (iii) a Spare Management Unit (SMU).
A BC is a model of a physical or logical system component.
For each system component that is modeled, a BC is defined,
describing the corresponding operation and failure modes of
the component. For example, a pump can fail by not working,
a valve, on the other hand, can fail by being stuck in open
or closed position. The RU defines the way in which the
repair of a BC is organized. Different BCs can have the same
RU. This happens, for example, when faults occur at different
BCs that belong to the same RU. The RU will then schedule
the order in which the repairs are performed. Components
can have spares that can take over their functionality. The
SMU handles the usage of these spare components. When
the primary component fails, a spare component is activated.
When the primary has been repaired, the SMU deactivates the
active spare component. Arcade describes the system failures
by means of a fault tree (FT).
Arcade analysis. Arcade translates the buildingblocks to
Input/Output Interactive Markov Chains (I/O-IMCs) for their
analysis, and applies the powerful compositional aggregation
technique to generate the underlying Continuous Time Markov
Chain (CTMC). In some cases, non-determinism may be
present in the system, so that a continuous-time Markov deci-
sion process is generated. Non-determinism is easy to detect,
and did not occur in our models. That is, Arcade composes the
I/O-IMC buildingblocks one-by-one and applies minimization
techniques (a.k.a. lumping) after each composition. Formally,
IMCs extend Continues Time Markov Chains by introducing
action labels to transitions. I/O-IMCs extend IMCs by making
the action transitions either direct or delayed events. A direct
transition, denoted by a x!, is an output event, and a delayed
transition, denoted by x?, is an input event. These I/O-IMCs
allow one component to inform other components about its
failure, so that they can react on it. The Arcade analysis
method has been implemented in a toolset using CADP as
a back-end [3].
IV. ARCADE MODEL OF WATER DISTRIBUTION
To model the distribution part of a water treatment facility
in Arcade, we create BCs for the valves and the tank. A valve
can fail in two ways, it can either be stuck closed or open.
In the following, we assume that a valve stuck open in the
distribution process does not constitute a failure as it does not
disrupt the distribution. Hence, a valve being stuck closed or
open is modeled by two separate transitions. A tank can fail
because of several reasons, it can rupture, be contaminated or
leak. For simplicity, we assume in the following that a tank
can only fail in one way. It is also assumed that the pipes do
not fail and are therefore not modeled. For simplicity every
BC has its own RU.
By composing the RUs with the corresponding BCs, we
obtain a general I/O-IMC for a valve and one for the tank.
Figure 3(a) shows the composed I/O-IMC model of a valve.
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Fig. 3. I/O-IMC of water treatment Arcade model
For every valve, an instance of this model with the values
λvalve−open = λvalve−close = 3/6000 and µvalve = 1 is
used. This corresponds to a valve breaking slowly and being
repaired quickly. Figure 3(b) shows the composed I/O-IMC
model of a tank. For this model, the values λtank = 1/6000
and µtank = 5/60 are used. This corresponds to the tank
failing more slowly than a valve, and also being repaired more
slowly than a valve. The unit of time for the given rates is per
hour. Note that these are made-up values that do not reflect
reality.
From Figure 2 we extract a fault tree that describes the need
for both water districts to receive water. This fault tree can be
written down as follows:
Systemfail ≡
V alve4fail ∨ V alve5fail
∨V alve6fail ∨ Tankfail
∨(V alve1fail ∧ V alve2fail)
∨((V alve1fail ∨ V alve2fail) ∧ V alve3fail).
With the above I/O-IMCs and the specified fault tree Arcade
can be used to create the minimized version of the underlying
CTMC.
V. DEPENDABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY MEASURES
Reliability is defined [7] as the probability of having no
system failure within a certain mission time assuming that
no component is repaired; availability is defined [1] as the
probability of the system being in an operational state within
a mission time assuming that components are repaired. In [4],
Cloth et al. define survivability as the ability of a system
to recover predefined service levels in a timely manner after
the occurrence of disasters. Using CSL, this property can be
expressed as a formula stating that any disaster is recoverable,
that is
survivability ≡ disaster⇒ recoverability.
Recoverability for a given time bound t and probability bound
p means that the system returns to predefined service levels
before time t with at least probability p, formalized by the
following CSL formula.
recoverability ≡ P≥p(3≤tservice).
Survivability analysis in Arcade. To compute survivability
in Arcade the failure and operation states of the components
need to be identifiable in the composed system model. Without
this information, it is impossible to use the CSL formulas to
compute survivability. However, during the Arcade composing
process the information about the failure of a specific compo-
nent is lost. Only the operational status of the entire system is
known, and not that of the specific component. To circumvent
this problem two possible solution were considered: (i) No
hiding: by not hiding transitions when parallel composing
components, the transition information remains usable. How-
ever, this has a side effect on the size of the state space. (ii)
Adding atomic properties (APs) to states: the states as used
by CADP models have no APs, and CADP does not have
the option to add them. An AP could be added to a state by
creating a self-loop for the state indicating the AP.
The first option gave us a state space that could not
be created in four days of calculation (The last count was
approximately 5 million states and approximately 77 million
transitions), whereas the second option results in a state space
of only 35330 states and 405112 transitions. The size of the
state space of option one makes computing any measures on
it a time consuming task. Therefore, it was not used.
Arcade does not provide any means of checking models
against CSL formulas. Hence, MRMC [5] is used to model
check the underlying CTMC for survivability. However, in
order to use MRMC, the Arcade model needs to be trans-
formed in the following way: (i) The fail and up transitions
that indicate the state of the entire system need to be hidden.
(ii) All tau transitions present in the Arcade model are removed
by using the CADP REDUCTOR tool. This does not affect the
model, as the tau transitions are unimportant remnants of input
and output transitions that were used for composing.
These steps reduce the size of the state space even more. The
resulting MRMC model has 1458 states and 13122 transitions.
Survivability specifications The notion of survivability that
we follow in this paper requires the definition of disasters and
service levels as CSL formulas.
We define three different disasters that can possibly occur
in the distribution process. The first disaster is valve4 failing,
while all other components are still functional:
disaster 1 ≡ (V alve4fail).
The second disaster is a failing tank:
disaster 2 ≡ (Tankfail).
The third disaster is defined to be valve1 and valve3 failing:
disaster 3 ≡ (V alve1fail ∧ V alve3fail).
The three service levels are defined as follows. In Service
level one only district 1 receives water:
service level 1 ≡ (V alve1up ∧ V alve4up)
∨(V alve2up ∧ V alve3up ∧ V alve4up).
In Service level two only district 2 receives water:
service level 2 ≡ (V alve2up ∨ (V alve1up ∧ V alve3up))
∧V alve5up ∧ V alve6up ∧ Tankup.
And in Service level three both districts receive water:
service level 3 ≡ V alve1up ∧ V alve2up ∧ V alve3up
∧V alve4up ∧ V alve5up
∧V alve6up ∧ Tankup.
VI. DEPENDABILITY EVALUATION
In this section, we present and discuss the resulting avail-
ability (A), reliability (R) and survivability (S) of the water
distribution process. Figure 4 shows the availability of the dis-
tribution station over time. While at time zero the availability
of the distribution process is 1 it decreases within the first
505 hours (approx. half a year) to 0.92, while the long-run
availability is 0.84. Figure 5 illustrates the reliability of the
distribution station over time. It can be seen that the model
quickly becomes less reliable if no repairs are performed. After
1345 hours the system is only operational with probability
0.48. Using the different definitions of disasters and service
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Fig. 4. Availability over time
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Fig. 5. Reliability over time
levels as described in Section V, we compute the survivability
of the distribution station over time using MRMC. Figure 6
shows how fast the system recovers to service level 1 after
the occurrence of one of the three different disasters. For
disaster 2 the probability to recover to service level 1 is 1,
immediately (hence, this line does not show). This is because
a failure of the tank does not influence the distribution to
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Fig. 6. Survivability over time (Service level 1)
water district 1. After the occurrence of disaster 1, i.e. the
failure of valve4, the process is recovered with probability 1
after 17 hours. Whereas, after the failure of both valve3 and
valve1, the process is fully recovered after 10 hours. This can
be explained as follows. The repair of either valve3 or valve1
is sufficient to again distribute water to District 1. Hence, the
probability of repair is higher than in the case of disaster 1.
Figure 7 shows how the system recovers to service level 2
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Fig. 7. Survivability over time (Service level 2)
given the occurrence of one of the three disasters. Disaster 1
and disaster 3 do not have any impact on the distribution to
the second district, hence probability to recover from these
disasters is 1, immediately. The recovery from a tank failure
(disaster 2) is slow, the probability to reach service level 2
after 30 hours is only 0.92. This is due to the longer repair
time for a tank. Note that the longer mean time to failure
(MTTF) for a tank is not taken into account, as we do not
model the failure explicitly, but assume that the failure has
just happened. Figure 8 shows that to recover from disaster 1
or from disaster 3 (valve failures) to service level 3 (full
service) with probability 1 only takes a few hours. Again, the
recovery from a tank failure (disaster 2) takes much longer
due to the lower repair rate.
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Fig. 8. Survivability over time (Service level 3)
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented our preliminary work on
dependability and survivability modeling and analysis of the
water distribution process in a water treatment facility. Using
Arcade we have created a CTMC of the water distribution
station, and directly computed availability and reliability. Fur-
thermore, we have adapted the Arcade model to be model
checked by MRMC for survivability. We conclude that the
survivability model, resulting from Arcade is correct since
MRMC produced exactly the same survivability measures for
a manually created CTMC of the distribution station.
Future work includes a more comprehensive analysis of the
water distribution station. In particular, we plan to compute
quantitative properties. For instance, rather than computing the
survivability as the probability to reach a predefined discrete
service level, we plan to derive the expected service level (in
terms of available water) after a disaster. On the implemen-
tation side, we plan to incorporate CSL model checking and
survivability analysis within the Arcade toolset, so that future
analysis becomes easier.
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